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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 The holding by the United States Supreme Court in Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court1 
dangerously expanded the scope of searches and seizures permitted under the Fourth 
Amendment.  The holding also critically circumscribed individual rights against self-
incrimination protected by the Fifth Amendment.  The Hiibel Court held that under the Fourth 
Amendment, a person may be incarcerated for refusing to give his name when a police officer 
                                                 
1 542 U.S. 177 (2004). 
3 
demands it.2  Simultaneously, the Court held that the disclosure of a name does not “tend to” 
incriminate a person such that the individual’s Fifth Amendment rights are violated by forcing 
them to identify himself.3 
 The Hiibel decision overtly violates our basic constitutional rights.  Moreover, the 
Court’s analysis is wholly inconsistent – specifically, the Court first indicates that knowing a 
detainee’s name is “crucial” to the effectiveness and safety of standard police work.4  However, 
the Court rationalizes that a name is not intrusive because it feels that knowing a suspect’s name 
will be of use only rarely, in “unusual circumstances.”5  These two propositions are in direct 
contradiction with each other, and render unclear the court’s justifications for holding the statute 
that required disclosure of a name constitutional. 
 In any event, the “unusual” circumstances the Court indicates are sufficient to render the 
statute in Hiibel in plain violation of the Fifth Amendment.6  Additionally, although the Supreme 
Court has recognized exceptions to the Fourth Amendment, these narrow holdings are not nearly 
broad enough to include the Nevada statute.  In addition to problematic Constitutional violations, 
in practice, police officers and individuals are hard-pressed during the moment of contact to 
determine whether a specific inquiry is constitutional.  Hiibel requires that officers and civilians 
choose between an illegitimate arrest and the sacrifice of important constitutional rights. 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 185 (2004). 
3 Id. at 180. 
4 See M. CHRISTINE KLEIN, CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW, A BIRD CALLED HIIBEL: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF 
SILENCE (2004), www.cato.org/pubs/scr/2004/birdcalledhiibel.pdf. 
5 Id. 
6 Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 191. 
4 
II. RULE OF STOPPING AND QUESTIONING 
 A. Levels of Police Contact 
 The public’s interactions with police personnel can be broken up into three very broad 
levels of communication.  First, everyday conversation generally does not implicate one’s 
constitutional rights.  Greeting an officer in public or a request for the time of day or general 
directions to a place are not generally interactions that warrant a constitutional protection 
analysis. 
 The next level of communication is not quite an arrest, but carries similar characteristics.  
This level is best illustrated in the context of a “Terry stop,” a type of encounter first recognized 
by the United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio in 1968.7  Terry stops permit a police 
officer to detain an individual for an investigation based upon a reasonable suspicion that a crime 
has been or is about to be committed.8  Unlike the lowest level of police contact, important 
constitutional rights are implicated in a Terry stop.9 
 The pinnacle of police contact is usually an arrest.  In order to arrest an individual, an 
officer must have probable cause that a crime has been committed.10  This scenario activates the 
full scope of the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures, as well as 
the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. 
 B. Limits of Terry Stops 
 In Terry v. Ohio, an experienced officer assigned to patrol a Cleveland neighborhood for 
shoplifters and pickpockets observed two individuals standing in an intersection.  The officer 
                                                 
7 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
8 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). 
9 Id. 
10 People v. Hamilton, 638 N.W.2d 92 (Mich. 2002) (“constitutional validity of an arrest depends on whether 
probable cause to arrest existed at the time the arrest was made”). 
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watched each individual repeatedly walk by store windows and peer in.11  He noticed that a third 
man approached the pair once and then abruptly departed.12 
 Based on his experience, he suspected a stick-up, fearing also that the individuals 
“[might] have a gun.”13  When they stopped in front of the store window to speak with the third 
man again, the officer approached them, identified himself as a police officer, and asked for their 
names.14   When one of the men “mumbled something” in response to his questions, the officer 
spun him around and patted him down.  The officer discovered guns on two of the men.15 
 The two individuals were charged with violating an Ohio statute that made it illegal for a 
person other than a law enforcement officer to carry a gun.16  The statute provided in part that 
“no person shall carry a pistol, bowie knife, dirk, or other dangerous weapon concealed on or 
about his person,” although an express exception is made for properly authorized law 
enforcement officers.17  At trial, each defendant made a motion to suppress the guns, arguing 
they were obtained pursuant to an illegal search and seizure because at the time of the pat-down, 
the officer did not have probable cause to arrest them.18  The trial court held that although it 
would be “stretching the facts beyond reasonable comprehension” to find that the officer had 
probable cause to arrest the men, the officer still possessed “reasonable cause to believe… that 
the defendants were conducting themselves suspiciously.”19  The court found that the frisk was 
essential to the proper performance of the officer’s duties and that for his own protection, he had 
the right to pat down the men whom he reasonably had cause to believe were armed.  The Ohio 
                                                 
11 Terry, 392 U.S. at 6. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 7. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 5. 
17 Ohio Rev. Code § 2923.01 (1953). 
18 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 5-8. 
19 Id. at 7-8. 
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Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed defendant’s appeal on the 
ground that no substantial constitutional question was involved. 20 
 On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court upheld the Ohio Supreme Court’s 
conviction for felon in possession of a deadly weapon over the defendant’s objections that 
probable cause for the search did not exist, as required under the Fourth Amendment.21  In its 
analysis, the Court noted that “[t]he Fourth Amendment governs ‘seizures’ of the person which 
do not eventuate in a trip to the station house and prosecution for crime – ‘arrests’ in traditional 
terminology,” and held that a person is “seized” whenever a police officer accosts an individual 
and restrains his freedom to walk away.22  The Court found it indisputable that a “careful 
exploration of the outer surfaces of a person’s clothing all over his or her body in an attempt to 
find weapons” is a “search” that also must not be undertaken lightly.23  The Court held that the 
officer both “seized” petitioner and subjected him to a “search” when he stopped him, took hold 
of him, and patted down his clothing.24 
The Court noted an important state interest in “effective crime prevention and detection,” 
as well as a state interest in an officer “assur[ing] himself that the person with whom he is 
dealing is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him.”25  
Acknowledging that “[e]ven a limited search of the outer clothing for weapons constitutes a 
severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security,” the Court formulated a two-
step test to be used in making the determination that the pat-down did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment: (1) the officer had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity; and (2) the officer had 
                                                 
20 214 N.E.2d 114 (Ohio 1966).  One defendant died during the appeal proceedings, so the Supreme Court addressed 
the conviction of the remaining defendant only.  See Terry, 392 U.S. at 5. 
21 Id. at 5-6. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 19, 30. 
25 Id. at 23. 
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reasonable suspicion of danger.26  The Court recognized that stops must be based on “reasonable 
suspicion” – basically, “the officer’s action must be justified at its inception, and it must be 
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first 
place.”27  The Court decided both reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and reasonable 
suspicion of danger were present on the facts in Terry because of the defendant’s suspicious 
behavior around the store.  The Court also noted the officer’s reasonable articulated suspicion 
that they “[might] have a gun.”28  Thus the “protective seizure and search for weapons” 
formulated as a frisk of the outer clothing did not violate the Fourth Amendment probable cause 
requirement.29 
Although the Court recognized that the officer “seized” the defendants when they 
restrained their freedom to walk away and asked them questions, the Court did not directly 
address whether the defendants were required to answer the police officer.  The Court instead 
focused its analysis on the physical pat-down search, holding that while “investigating [unusual 
conduct] he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, he is entitled for 
the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer 
clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons.”30  However, Justice White noted 
the issue in his concurrence, writing that although “given the proper circumstances . . . the person 
may be briefly detained against his will while pertinent questions are directed to him,” he “is not 
obliged to answer, answers may not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an 
arrest.”31 
                                                 
26 Id. at 20. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 6, 30. 
29 Id. at 20, 29. 
30 Id. at 30. 
31 Id. at 34-35 (White, J., concurring). 
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The Supreme Court in Terry, after careful analysis, created a narrow exception to the 
Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures.  In creating this exception, 
the Court did not trample over the integrity of the Fourth Amendment.  Rather, the Court 
expressly made the standard especially high, requiring that reasonable suspicion of both criminal 
activity and danger be present to justify the intrusion. 
 C. The Rule in Hiibel 
 In Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court,32 an officer received a report from an anonymous 
caller that a man was assaulting a woman in a vehicle.  Investigating the location the caller 
indicated, the officer observed a man in a truck with a female passenger.33  The officer 
approached the man, told him that he was investigating an assault and then asked for the 
individual’s name.34  The defendant, Larry Hiibel, refused to divulge his identity, instead asking 
the officer why his identification was needed.35  The officer repeated that he was conducting an 
investigation and “wanted to find out who [he] was and what he was doing there.”36  Hiibel 
continued to refuse to divulge his identity, insisting he had done nothing wrong.37 
 This exchange went on for several minutes, until Hiibel was ultimately arrested by the 
officer.  Hiibel was charged with obstruction of the police officer’s duties because his refusal to 
comply violated Nevada Revised Statute § 199.280, which prohibited the “willful[] resist[ance], 
delay or obstruct[ion of] a police officer in discharging or attempting to discharge any legal duty 
to his office.”38  At trial, the government argued that Hiibel had obstructed the officer in carrying 
                                                 
32 542 U.S. 177, 181 (2004). 
33 Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 180 (2004). 
34 Id. at 181. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id.  In total, the officer’s twelve requests were met by twelve refusals.  
38 Nev. Rev. Stat. § 199.280. 
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out his duties under  Nevada Revised Statute § 171.123, which defines the legal rights and duties 
of a police officer in an investigative stop.”39  The statute states, in pertinent part: 
(1) Any peace officer may detain any person whom the officer encounters 
under circumstances which reasonably indicate that the person has 
committed, is committing or is about to commit a crime.40 
 
* * * 
 
(3) The officer may detain the person pursuant to this section only to 
ascertain his identity and the suspicious circumstances surrounding his 
presence abroad.  Any person so detained shall identify himself, but may 
not be compelled to answer any other inquiry of any peace officer.41 
 
The Justice Court of Union Township, where Hiibel was initially tried, held that his refusal to 
identify himself as required by § 171.123 “obstructed and delayed [the officer] in attempting to 
discharge his duty” in violation of § 199.280.  Hiibel’s appeal on Fourth Amendment grounds 
was denied at the state court level, and his petition for rehearing to resolve his Fifth Amendment 
challenge was denied without opinion.42 
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court held that the statute did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment, declaring simply that under Terry, the demand for a name had an 
“immediate relation to the purpose, rationale, and practical demands of a Terry stop.”43  The 
Court held that a law enforcement officer’s reasonable suspicion that a person may be involved 
in criminal activity permits the officer to stop the person for a brief time and take additional steps 
to investigate further.44  When faced with the Fifth Amendment challenge, the Court responded 
                                                 
39 Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 181. 
40 Nev. Rev. Stat. § 171.123. 
41 Nev. Rev. Stat. § 171.123 (emphasis added). 
42 Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 59 P.3d 1201 (Nev. 2002). 
43 Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 188. 
44 Id. 
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that the disclosure of his name presented no reasonable danger of incrimination, and therefore 
the statute did not violate his Fifth Amendment rights.45 
III. ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF IDENTIFICATION STATUTES 
 A. Vagrancy Laws and the Uniform Arrest Act 
 Stop-and-identify statutes like the Nevada statute in Hiibel “have their roots in English 
laws forbidding vagrancy, which permitted the police to arrest a person unless they gave ‘a good 
Account of themselves.’”46  Courts have traditionally found laws that allow a law enforcement 
officer to ask – or require a person to disclose – the person’s identity, void for vagueness.47  
Because of the wide range of activities that an officer could reasonably decide constitute 
“vagrancy,” the statutes did not provide individuals with proper notice of which behaviors would 
subject a suspect to the threat of arrest, permitting unfettered police discretion.48 
 For example, recently, the United States Supreme Court in Kolender v. Lawson49 struck 
down for vagueness an identification statute that required a suspect to provide “credible and 
reliable” identification.  The Court held that the officer had too much discretion to define the 
standard for “credible and reliable.”50  Like vagrancy laws, “laws ordering suspects to produce 
identification upon a lawful police request [may not] be vague, as this vagueness would allow 
potentially indiscriminate behavior on the part of police.”51  Although the Court clearly implied 
                                                 
45 Id. at 189. 
46 Robert A. Hull, “What Hath Hiibel Wrought? The Constitutionality of Compelled Self-Identification,” 33 PEPP. L. 
REV. 185, 188 (2005). 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 461 U.S. 352 (1983). 
50 Hull, supra note 46, at 188-89. 
51 Id. at 188. 
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in dicta that there could be a compelled identification statute that would pass its vagueness test, 
the statute at issue in the case did not.52 
 Despite the overall judicial disfavor for “stop and identify” statutes, the Hiibel Court 
upheld the Nevada statute.  In doing so, the Court rationalized that states with “stop and identify” 
statutes have modeled their statutes on the Uniform Arrest Act. 53  The Uniform Arrest Act is a 
model act drafted by the Interstate Commission on Crime, compiled by suggestions of committee 
members that included police officers, prosecutors, attorneys general, judges, defense attorneys, 
and law teachers.54  On the topic of compelled identification, the Uniform Arrest Act states in 
part: 
(1) A peace officer may stop any person abroad whom he has 
reasonable ground to suspect is committing, has committed or is 
about to commit a crime, and may demand of him his name, 
address, business abroad and whither he is going. 
 
(2) Any person so questioned who fails to identify himself or 
explain his actions to the satisfaction of the officer may be 
detained and further questioned and investigated. 
 
(3) The total period of detention provided for by this section shall 
not exceed two hours.  Such detention is not an arrest and shall not 
be recorded as an arrest in any official record.  At the end of the 
detention the person so detained shall be released or be arrested 
and charged with a crime.55 
 
 There are serious problems with the Hiibel Court’s assertion that the Nevada statute is 
implicitly endorsed by the Uniform Arrest Act (UAA).  First, the UAA permits an officer to stop 
                                                 
52 Id. at 189 (“Appellants stress the need for strengthened law enforcement tools to combat the epidemic of crime 
that plagues our Nation.  The concern of our citizens with curbing criminal activity is certainly a matter requiring the 
attention of all branches of government.  As weighty as this concern is, however, it cannot justify legislation that 
would otherwise fail to meet constitutional standards for definiteness or clarity.  Section 647(e), as presently 
construed requires that ‘suspicious’ persons satisfy some undefined identification requirement, or face criminal 
punishment.  Although due process does not require ‘impossible standards’ of clarity, this is not a case where further 
precision in the statutory language is either impossible or impractical”). 
53 Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 183. 
54 Sam B. Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REV. 315, 316 (1942). 
55 Id. at 320-21 (emphasis added). 
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a person and “demand of him his name, address, business abroad, and whither he is going.”56  
However, a careful reading of the Act indicates that even if the person refuses to identify 
himself, the officer may only detain him for a slightly longer period.57  Moreover, the UAA 
expressly declares this detention is not an arrest and may not be recorded as such.58  The Nevada 
statute cannot permit the arrest of Hiibel for a simple refusal to identify himself and still be 
consistent with the UAA.  Because the statute is distinct from these requirements of the Uniform 
Arrest Act, the Hiibel Court’s reliance on it is misplaced. 
 B. Compelled Identification Statutes in Various States 
 Despite the constitutional problems facing compelled identification statutes, these statutes 
are not uncommon among the states.  Delaware59 and Rhode Island60 authorize police to demand 
a detainee’s destination.  Illinois61 and New York62 even go so far as to permit police officers to 
demand a detainee’s address and an explanation of his conduct. 
 Some identification statutes are even bolder.  In New Hampshire63 for example, a statute 
allows an officer to “demand” a detainee’s name, address, business abroad, and destination.  In 
Massachusetts,64 police officers “may examine all persons abroad whom they have reason to 
suspect of unlawful design, and may demand of them their business abroad and whither they are 
going,” warning that “[p]ersons so suspected who do not give a satisfactory account of 
themselves . . . may be arrested by the police.”65  The Massachusetts statute in particular comes 
treacherously close to vagueness because it leaves open the definition of “satisfactory” and 
                                                 
56 Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 183. 
57 See Warner, supra note 54, at 36. 
58 See id. 
59 Del. Code Ann. Tit. 11, 1902 (2003). 
60 R.I. Gen. Laws 12-7-1 (2003). 
61 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/107-14 (2004). 
62 N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 140.50(1) (2004). 
63 N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 594.2 (2003). 
64 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 41, 98 (2003). 
65 Id. 
13 
allows for greater danger of harassment and racial profiling.  With its broad holding that the 
inquiry was related to the purpose and practical demands of a Terry stop, the Hiibel decision 
likely sanctions these other states’ statutes as well, thereby authorizing police officers to demand 
far more than a person’s name.  The Hiibel Court’s endorsement of the Nevada statute’s demand 
for a name has very wide implications, going far beyond the narrow, two-pronged scope of the 
Terry exception to the Fourth Amendment. 
 C. Other Contexts of Compelled Identification 
 One context in which identification statutes have not faced significant constitutional 
challenge is when the statute requires disclosure of an offender’s name following a traffic 
accident.  In Durney v. Doss,66 for example, the court recognized an officer’s right to arrest an 
individual based on his “reason to believe that [the defendant] was violating the law by refusing 
to provide information to them or to Jones” following a traffic accident.  Presented with a 
situation similar on the facts in Hiibel, the court in Durney issued its holding in light of a state 
statute prohibiting the obstruction of a law-enforcement officer in the performance of his lawful 
duties67 and another statute requiring drivers who damage unattended property to provide the 
owner of such property with their name, address, driver’s license number and vehicle registration 
number.68 
 The Nevada statute and the vehicular accident statutes, however, arise from entirely 
distinct situations.  In the latter case, the statutory language presupposes that there is no dispute 
as to whether an incident or crime has taken place.  The statute is activated under the assumption 
that the crime has already taken place and its perpetrators are already known and/or evident.  The 
individual in these cases is not a “suspect.”  The Durney statute is not of an investigatory nature, 
                                                 
66 106 Fed. App’x 166, 170 (2004). 
67 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-460. 
68 Va. Code Ann. § 46.2-896. 
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like the Nevada statute.  Because of this critical distinction, a reliance on these types of statutes 
is misplaced. 
IV. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT VIOLATION: BEYOND THE SCOPE OF TERRY 
 
 The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,” and ensures that “no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .”69  “No right is held more sacred, or is more 
carefully guarded, by the common law,” than the Fourth Amendment, which represents “the right 
of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or 
interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.”70  The sanctity of the 
Fourth Amendment requires the exceptions be narrowly defined.71 
 Arguably the most well-established exception was recognized by the United States 
Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio.72  Acknowledging both the need to protect the immediate safety 
of law enforcement actors and the relatively brief nature of the physical intrusion involved in a 
pat-down search for weapons, the Court in Terry carefully delineated an exception to the Fourth 
Amendment.73  Although it circumvents the Fourth Amendment probable cause requirement, the 
Terry holding specifically notes that its exception has a narrow scope and, accordingly, develops 
an analysis reflecting this philosophy.74  The Hiibel Court’s holding violates the Fourth 
Amendment because it goes far beyond the scope of the exception recognized in Terry. 
 Terry painstakingly crafted a two-step analysis to determine the constitutionality of a stop 
in order to preserve the sanctity of the Fourth Amendment.75  More specifically, Terry held that a 
                                                 
69 U.S. CONST., amend. IV. 
70 Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). 
71 See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 30. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 30-31. 
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law enforcement officer’s reasonable suspicion that a person may be involved in criminal 
activity, along with his belief that petitioner was presently armed, dangerous, and posed a threat 
to him and to others, justified the “stop” and the “frisk.”76  The Court described a “seizure” for 
purposes of the Fourth Amendment as any situation where a police officer accosts an individual 
and restrains his freedom to walk away, and recognized that the Terry defendants were “seized” 
when they were searched for weapons.77  Thus, Terry can be used as precedent for both 
questionable seizures and problematic searches. 
The attempt to obtain a suspect’s name is a “search” because it is an effort to draw out 
information that is not readily available to the officer.  It requires active investigation by the 
officer to compel a person – who, notably, is not under arrest – to disclose a fact.  The search 
also morphs into a seizure because the threat of arrest is imminent.  The individual being 
questioned has an option between answering the officer’s orders and getting arrested, so he or 
she has no real choice at all.  Because his freedom to walk away is effectively restrained, the 
search for a name also constitutes a seizure under the language of the Terry holding.78  The Court 
in Hiibel also recognized the demand for a name had characteristics of both search and seizure, 
holding that a law enforcement officer with reasonable suspicion is permitted to stop a person for 
a brief time and ask questions (a search) and that “the resulting seizure is constitutionally 
reasonable” if the officer’s action is “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which 
justified the interference in the first place.”79 
                                                 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 30-31. 
79 Id. at 20. 
16 
The Terry Court construed a “weapons frisk” as within this “scope,” because the officer’s 
action was reasonable to protect his own safety.80  The holding in Hiibel, however, steps far 
outside the bounds of its holding in Terry because it does not analyze the demand for a name 
under Terry’s two-step rule.  Hiibel ignores the fact that the Terry exception to the warrant 
requirement is a strict standard, requiring that “the investigative method employed [] be the least 
intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion in a short period 
of time.”81 
 The Court in Hiibel balanced the “intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment 
interests against its promotion of legitimate government interests.”82  In the government’s favor, 
the Hiibel Court reasoned that “[t]he request for identity has an immediate relation to the Terry 
stop’s purpose, rationale, and practical demands, and the threat of criminal sanction helps ensure 
that the request does not become a legal nullity.”83  However, the practical demands of the Terry 
stop did not require the disclosure of a name.  Rather, the practical demands required only a brief 
physical frisk for weapons because a name would not have immediately indicated the presence of 
the weapon on the suspect.  A name will immediately reveal only an abstract label whereas the 
search would reveal weapons that present an immediate threat to the safety of the officers and 
others.  In no way was the officer in Hiibel presented with an immediate potential threat by not 
knowing the defendant’s name in the same way the Terry officer was threatened by not knowing 
if the defendant had a weapon.  The facts of the Hiibel case do not indicate that the officer even 
had a belief that the defendant was armed and dangerous.  Moreover, the tip provided to the 
officer in Hiibel did not include a name, so Hiibel’s involvement in any criminal activity would 
                                                 
80 Id. at 28 (emphasis added). 
81 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). 
82 Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 188.  
83 Id. 
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not have been confirmed by the disclosure of his name.  Therefore, the Hiibel holding 
completely ignores the second element of the Terry analysis. 
The Hiibel Court did address Justice White’s concurrence in Terry, where he wrote that a 
person detained in an investigative stop is “not obliged to answer.”84  The Hiibel Court also 
noted that twenty years earlier, in Berkemer v. McCarty,85 it described a Terry stop as having a 
“nonthreatening character” because a suspect detained during such a stop “is not obliged to 
respond to questions.”  However, the Court in Hiibel “[did] not find the statements [] 
controlling.”86  Correctly noting that the Fourth Amendment cannot require a suspect to answer 
questions because it does not “impose obligations on the citizen but instead provides rights 
against the government,” the Court then perplexingly held that because the “source of the legal 
obligation arises from Nevada state law, not the Fourth Amendment,” the Court’s prior 
statements that a suspect cannot be compelled to answer were not binding.87 
This Fourth Amendment analysis is baffling.  If, as the Court notes, the purpose of the 
Fourth Amendment is to provide rights against the government, then the proper defense against 
the statute in Hiibel is, in fact, a constitutional right.  Obviously, the obligation on the citizen 
cannot arise from the Fourth Amendment.  Constitutional rights, for all intents and purposes, 
places obligations on the government to not violate those rights.  The Court’s basis for the 
dismissal of its prior statements in the Terry concurrence and in the Berkemer majority does not 
hold water. 
                                                 
84 Id. at 187, quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 34 (White, J., concurring). 
85 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984). 
86 Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 187. 
87 Id. 
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 The sole justification for the Terry Court’s holding is the protection of the police officer 
and others nearby.88  A Terry stop should not be a generalized “cursory search for … 
anything.”89  For example, the dissenting judges of the Nevada Supreme Court in Hiibel noted 
that because a wallet does not present a physical threat, an officer may not pull it out during a 
Terry search if its identity is evident, and the majority did not refute this assertion at either the 
state supreme court level or the U.S. Supreme Court level.90  Nevertheless, under the statute in 
Hiibel, he is allowed, for all intents and purposes, to do just that by demanding identification. 
V. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT VIOLATION: REQUIRING DISCLOSURE OF 
 INCRIMINATING INFORMATION 
 
 The text of the Fifth Amendment assures us that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .”91  This language “[p]rotects against any 
disclosures that the witness reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or could 
lead to other evidence that might be so used.”92  Courts have developed three requirements that a 
disclosure must meet to qualify for Fifth Amendment privilege – namely, “a communication 
must be testimonial, incriminating, and compelled.”93 
 Requiring the disclosure of a name meets the “compelled” requirement.  The Supreme 
Court in Miranda v. Arizona94 made it clear that a person’s Fifth Amendment rights attach as 
soon as the individual is deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.  By 
threatening arrest if a person does not comply with the demand for a name, these statements are 
                                                 
88 Id. 
89 Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93-94 (1979). 
90 Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 59 P.3d 1201, 1209 (2002) (Agosti, J., dissenting). 
91 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
92 Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 190. 
93 United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 34-38 (2000). 
94 384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966). 
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not “given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences,” as Miranda requires.95  
The statute in Hiibel thus compels information. 
 The more difficult issues that arise are whether identity is so unique that it can never be 
testimonial or incriminating.  In Crawford v. Washington,96 the Court held that statements made 
in response to police interrogation constitute testimonial statements.  The Hiibel Court did not 
directly address whether the defendant’s name was testimonial.  Presumably, this is because the 
fact that a name is testimonial is apparent in light of the fact that the name is used to link a 
person to a crime.  In any event, the disclosure of a name in a police encounter like the one in 
Hiibel is a result of a police questioning and interrogating a suspect.  Thus, the name is 
“testimonial” under Crawford. 
 Despite the fact that the disclosure of a name likely meets both the “compelled” and 
“testimonial” prerequisites for Fifth Amendment protection, the Hiibel Court decided that the 
defendant’s “challenge must fail because in this case disclosure of his name presents no 
reasonable danger of incrimination.”97  However, a person’s name cannot be very innocuous if 
one is required to disclose it.  What, then, is the purpose of asking for a name? 
 If the caller in Hiibel had said Hiibel’s name as part of the description of a crime, then his 
confirmation of that name would have been incriminating for the assault he was sent there to 
investigate.  In other words, if a name is part of the investigatory framework to begin with, it is 
incriminating because it is directly linking Hiibel to a crime. 
 The Hiibel Court did not address the relevance of Hiibel’s name in connection with the 
crime under investigation.  Instead, the Court rationalized that “[i]nformation about the stopped 
                                                 
95 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966). 
96 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). 
97 Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 189. 
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person’s dangerousness or past violent activity can save [an] officer’s life.”98  The Court states 
specifically that the “[k]nowledge of identity may inform an officer that a suspect is wanted for 
another offense, or has a record of violence or mental disorder.”99  The Court’s holding makes it 
abundantly clear that law enforcement is in fact using the name as incriminating evidence, but 
for another crime – not for the crime or circumstances that justified the Terry stop.  The 
requirement under Terry is that a legitimate government interest must exist to justify the 
intrusion upon Fourth Amendment rights.  “The issue is not whether compelling an individual to 
identify himself is more or less intrusive than a weapons frisk; rather, it is whether there is a 
justification for the demand, as there was for the frisk.”100  This rationale removes the 
justification of the stop under Terry because there is no reasonable suspicion of the specific 
crime being investigated.  The Court cannot use the information received from the phone call as 
a justification for the Terry stop if the goal of the Terry stop was to arrest the suspect for 
previous crimes, not the crime explained over the phone. 
Moreover, the fact that the name may incriminate the suspect for some other crime 
plainly indicates that by requiring the individuals to disclose the name, the name is, by definition, 
incriminating information.  Compelling its disclosure is therefore a Fifth Amendment violation.  
Nevertheless, the Court decided against Hiibel on the basis that in his case, “disclosure of his 
name presented no reasonable danger of incrimination.”101  Police investigators, when trying to 
solve a crime, do not automatically know the name of the perpetrator.  The identity is simply 
another piece of evidence, like telephone records or a fingerprint.  A name identifies a person, 
connecting him or disconnecting him to the information accessible to the police officer.  
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Additionally, if a person is arrested under one of the statutes in New York, New Hampshire, or 
Massachusetts, which require divulging an address or destination, the information contained in 
the responses to this line of questioning even more easily resembles “incriminating” or 
“testimonial” communications than does just a name.  Depending on the circumstances, this kind 
of information could even more easily implicate an individual than his name could.  As the 
dissent in Hiibel pointed out, it is a “settled principle” that “the police have the right to request 
citizens to answer voluntarily questions concerning unsolved crimes,” but “they have no right to 
compel them to answer.”102    The Fifth Amendment protects compelled disclosure of such 
information, and the Court’s holding in Hiibel utterly steamrolls this right. 
VI. ILLEGITIMATELY ESTABLISHING PROBABLE CAUSE FOR AN ARREST: 
THE DILEMMA PRESENTED TO CITIZENS AND POLICE OFFICERS 
 
 Under compelled identification statutes, an officer is commanding a person to relinquish 
his constitutional right to remain silent and then arresting and searching someone if he refuses to 
do so.  The individual is forced to forfeit his anonymity and privacy, or face a criminal record.  
The arrest for failure to identify can be seen as a way for the officer to establish probable cause 
and/or gather evidence for the activity for which he had only reasonable suspicion.  The person 
must refuse to identify himself, thereby violating a stop and identify statute.  Without the stop 
and identify statute, however, the identity search of a person is invalid unless the officer can 
develop probable cause from other circumstances. 
 The Supreme Court found that “Hiibel argue[d] unpersuasively that the statute 
circumvents the probable-cause requirement by allowing an officer to arrest a person for being 
suspicious, thereby creating an impermissible risk of arbitrary police conduct.”103  Although the 
                                                 
102 Id. at 192-193. 
103 Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 159 L. Ed. 2d 292, 298 (2004). 
22 
Hiibel Court noted that these familiar concerns underlie Kolender v. Lawson,104 Brown v. 
Texas,105 and Papachristou v. Jacksonville,106 cases that found similar compelled identification 
statutes unconstitutional, it held that these concerns are met by “the requirement that a Terry stop 
be justified at its inception and be ‘reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which 
justified’ the initial stop.”107  However, 
“[t]his determination appears to be a bit self-serving, [] even though it may 
be technically ‘correct.’  It is difficult to determine exactly when a request 
for identification is not reasonably related to the circumstances justifying 
the stop, and the Court does not provide any guidance in resolving this 
matter.  The Court held, under facts where an officer was investigating an 
alleged assault, that the specific intrusion of compelling Hiibel to state 
only his name did not tip the Fourth Amendment balance in favor of the 
individual’s right to withhold such information.  It is not unreasonable to 
assume then that an officer can ask for an individual’s name in almost 
every circumstance where the individual is Terry-stopped, because given 
the requirements for a Terry stop, an officer will always have reasonable 
suspicion to believe a crime has been or is about to be committed and 
therefore his safety is always at risk in such a potentially criminal 
situation.”108 
 
 No reason exists why the subject of police interrogation based on mere suspicion, rather 
than probable cause, should have any lesser protection.  The Fifth Amendment’s protections 
should apply with equal force in the context of a Terry stop.  The message conveyed by Hiibel is 
that the less guilty one is, the fewer constitutional protections one has. 
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 Importantly, the Terry majority put aside the issue of whether a person could be 
compelled to answer questions during a Terry detainment.  In his concurrence in Terry, Justice 
White concluded that they could not: “Of course, the person stopped is not obliged to answer, 
answers may not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest, although it 
may alert the officer to a continued need for observation.”109  The Hiibel Court simply ignores 
the language in Terry. 
 The statute for obstructing police work that Hiibel was convicted of violating was not 
intended to arrest individuals who refuse to disclose their name in a routine investigation.  The 
language is strong, seeking to punish someone for willfully “resist[ing]” and “obstruct[ing]” 
police work.110  In the case at hand, Hiibel was not interfering – the officer was free to 
investigate the reported assault by asking him or the woman in the truck about the immediate 
circumstances.  Moreover, even if a court decides that refusing to answer an officer’s 
identification request constitutes interference with police work in some way, this fact would be 
irrelevant because the interference was an exercise of a valid constitutional right.  By definition, 
constitutional rights will always interfere with police work.  This is not, however, a justifiable 
reason to deny them.  The narrow exception in Terry recognized the inestimable integrity of an 
individual’s constitutional rights. 
 The question also arises as to the limitations on questioning.  Can on officer demand an 
address or for a driver’s license number?111  As Justice Stevens described in Hiibel, 
“[p]resumably the statute [in Hiibel] does not require the detainee to answer any other question 
because the Nevada Legislature realized that the Fifth Amendment prohibits compelling the 
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target of a criminal investigation to make any other statement.”112  The citizen is left on his own 
to determine the extent of questioning he is required to answer while he faces the highly stressful 
situation of an offensive police encounter.  “Given [the Court’s] statements to the effect that 
citizens are not required to respond to police officers’ questions during a Terry stop, it is no 
surprise that petitioner assumed, as have we, that he had a right not to disclose his identity.”113 
 In addition to the burden on the average American citizen to know the limitations of his 
constitutional rights in the highly stressful situation of confrontation by an officer, prior to an 
arrest, the Court’s holding puts a burden on police officers.  A police officer is now required to 
“keep track of the constitutional answers.”114  In addition to eroding the sanctity of our civil 
rights, this further undermines the integrity of our criminal justice system, causing the public to 
lose faith and the police departments to lose face in earnest efforts to exercise constitutional 
rights or enforce the law.  The Fourth and Fifth Amendments should not only protect the 
individual, but also should protect the officers from having to make the sorts of last minute 
decisions more appropriately reserved for a court of law. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 Terry requires a narrow scope reasonably related to legitimate government interests.  For 
the pat down search, the legitimate government interest is safety.  But the government does not 
have a legitimate interest in the request for a name.  If under the Fifth Amendment a detainee’s 
name neither incriminates him nor “furnish[es] a link in the chain of evidence needed to 
prosecute him, there is no legitimate government interest, consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment, in obtaining it.”115  Hiibel thus ignores the critical holding of Terry that the search 
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be reasonably related to legitimate government interests.116  The majority cites a strong 
governmental interest served by obtaining a suspect’s name during a Terry stop: “in this era of 
cross-linked criminal history databases, police could obtain information that “a suspect is wanted 
for another offense.”117  This rationalization, however, ultimately compels information clearly 
protected by the Fifth Amendment: evidence likely to tend to incriminate.  By ignoring its own 
previous statements and cherry-picking words from the Terry holding, the Hiibel Court 
effectively destroys the ability of police officers and civilians alike to determine the extent of the 
individual constitutional rights held by us as citizens. 
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